Introduction
Reproductive health care services, such as abortion and contraception, are the subject of a long -running and heated debate in biomedical ethics and health policy worldwide. On one side of the debate, those opposed to contraception and abortion liken their use to murder, and argue that the state should neither support such immoral actions, nor require objectors to participate in their provision. In response, advocates of rights to contraception and abortion argue that they are essential health services, access to which is necessary for the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms, health, and reproductive autonom y.
In this paper we examine the ongoing debate surrounding the rights of health care professionals to object to professional duties which conflict with the ir personal beliefs -with 2 particular reference to services which promote reproductive autonom y, such as abortion and contracept ion 1 . In doing so, we draw attention to a worrying trend in health care policy. To examine this trend we consider examples of a tendency in Europe and the United States to undermine women's rights to reproductive autonomy by prioritising the rights of ideologicall y motivated service providers to freedom of conscience.
Increasingl y, this occurs not onl y at the level of decision -making of individual health professionals, but also at higher levels of professional and state policy. We argue that some of the rights to freedom of conscience asserted by health care providers 2 are excessive in liberal societies , incompatible with liberal no rms 1 W hi le o t her a r ea s o f med ic al p ra ct ice r ai se si mi l arl y co mp l e x i s s ue s rela ti n g to co n sci e nt io u s o b j ect io n, p art ic ul arl y p h ys i cia n a s si st ed s ui cid e , we f o c u s o n ser v ice s wh ic h p ro mo t e r ep ro d uct i v e a u to no m y i n t h is p ap e r.
T hi s i s b e ca u se, wh i le t her e ar e si mi la ri tie s b et we e n t he t wo ca se s, t he y are s u f f ic i e nt l y d i f f er e n t t hat a n ad eq ua te d i sc u s sio n o f eac h ca se wo u l d no t b e p o ss ib l e i n a p a p er o f t h is le n g t h. Ho wev er, so me o f t he is s u e s d is c us sed i n t h is p ap er m a y b e r el e va nt to d i sc u s s io n s o f p h ys i cia n a s si st e d s ui cid e fo r e x a mp l e.
3 of pluralism and personal freedom, and impose unjustifiable costs on both individual persons, and societ y as a whole.
To make this argument we first consider the general claims in favour of the conflicting rights to freedom of conscience and reproductive autonomy. 3 Second, we examine two examples in the debate surrounding the conflict between these two competing rights claims. Our goal is to draw out the specific claims and counter-claims surrounding the two categories of right as the y are applied in t he policy context. In doing so, we examine the claims made by advocates for strong rights to conscientious objection and freedom of conscience in specific health care policy contexts. We argue that demands of the t ype made by conscientious objectors in the given examples are unreasonabl y broad, and would allow objecting health care providers to prevent other persons from enjoying their rights to reproductive autonom y, and to basic health care services. Consequentl y, the demands made by these objectors cannot be justified by appeal to liberal presumptions in favor of personal freedom. In closing,
we argue that the trend towards eve r-greater concessions to freedom of conscience in healthcare policy settings must be resisted in order to preserve other important rights.
3 T he se r i g ht s co n f li ct i n t hi s c a se; no t i n ge ne ra l. 4
Arguments in favour of rights to conscientious objection
The following account is intended to provide a d escriptive (rather than logical or normative ) overview of contexts in which the right to conscientious objection is generall y exercised:
1. A dut y to X is owed by all persons in group Y 2. Either the dut y itself, or its likel y consequences are deemed immoral by some members of Y 3. Some members of Y will assert a conscientious objection to X, and will request an exemption from the dut y to X
4. An exemption will be granted (or not) to some or all of those who objected, with or without conditions attached.
The right to exempt oneself from the fulfilment of a generall y held dut y is t ypically justified on the grounds that such a right is vital for the preservation of freedom of conscience. The latter is itself argued to be a core value of pluralist, liberal -democratic states, 4 and 'a moral right '. 5 Further, the rights to freedom of 5 conscience and conscientious objection are argued to be constitutive of liberty and autonom y, 6 and to be necessary for the preservation of individual moral integrit y. 7 In promoting these goods, t he rights are argued to be vital for the adequate toleration of different moral and philosophical perspectives in a pluralistic societ y. Correlativel y, failure to adequatel y protect freedom of conscience is argued to impose a particular view of the good on those who hold minorit y moral principles. This is argued to unjustifiabl y infringe upon the personal liberties of those with uncommon ethical perspectives and restrict their abilit y to live free lives. On this argument, denying rights to conscientious objection restricts personal libert y and autonom y. Each of these 6 E. C e va & S. Mo r a tt i. ' W ho se S el f -De ter mi n at i o n? B arr ier s to Ac ce ss t o E mer ge nc y Ho r mo na l C o nt r ac ep t io n i n I tal y'. K en n ed y In s t E th i c s J 2 0 1 3 ; 2 3 : 1 3 9 -1 6 7 : 1 3 9 .
7 M. R. W ic cl air . ' Co ns ci en tio u s Ob j ec tio n i n Me d ici n e '. Bio e th i cs 2 0 0 0 ; 1 4 : 2 0 5 -227.
8 D.P . S u l ma s y. 'W ha t i s Co n sc ie nc e a nd wh y i s R esp ect fo r i t s o I mp o r ta n t? '. Th eo r Med Bio e th 2 0 0 8 ; 2 9 : 1 3 5 -1 4 9 : 1 4 6 ; A. G i ub i li n i. 'T h e P ar ad o x o f Co n sci e nt i o u s Ob j ec tio n a nd t h e An e mi c Co n cep t o f 'Co n sc ie n ce ': Do wn p la y in g t he Ro le o f Mo r al I nt e gri t y i n Hea lt h C are '.
Ken n ed y I n st Eth ic s J 2 0 1 4 ; 2 4 : 1 5 9 -1 8 5 : 1 6 3 .
6
consequences are claimed to be considerable harms, which weigh in favor of guaranteeing rights to conscientious objection. Ca mb r id ge U n i ver si t y P r es s: 5 2 ; E.O . An a na t & D. M. H u n ger ma n . 'T he P o wer o f t he P il l fo r t he Ne xt G e nera tio n : Ora l Co nt racep tio n 's E ffec t s o n Fer ti li t y, Ab o r tio n, a nd Mat er nal & C h ild C hara cter is ti c s '. Rev E co n S t a t 2 0 1 2 ; 9 4 : 3 7 -5 1 .
15 A. B uc ha n a n, e t al . 
10
order to be granted exemption s to duties to which they object .
17
Like LaFollete and LaFollete, we reject the 'unqualified' status of rights of conscientious objection in the context of health care
provision for the reasons we set out below.
Example One: Health Care Professionals and

Conscientious Objection
Health care workers, includi ng physicians, midwives, nurses, 
'R eb u ke Up h eld i n R e f u sa l to Fi ll B ir t h Co ntr o l '. Mi l wa u ke e Wis co n s in
Jo u rn a l S en tin a l 2 6 Ma r ch .
C.T . Ga lla g h er , et al . 'T he Fo x a nd t he Grap e s : An An g lo -Iri s h
P er sp e cti v e o n Co n sci e nt io u s Ob j ect io n to t h e S up p l y o f E me r ge n c y Ho r mo na l Co n tr ac ep t io n wi t ho u t P re s crip tio n '. J M ed Eth ic s 2 0 1 3 ; 3 9 :
638-6 4 2 : 6 3 8 .
T he G u tt ma c her I n s ti t ut e. 2 0 1 5 . S ta te Po l ic i es in B rie f: R efu sin g t o Pro v id e Hea lth S er vi c es. Ne w Yo r k, N Y: T he G u tt ma c her I n s ti t ut e.
Av ai lab le at : ht tp : // www. g u t t mac h er.o r g /s ta tec en ter /sp ib s/ sp ib _ RP HS. p d f also been granted similar legal rights, which are even more widel y protected, with regard to participation in abortion or physician assisted suicide. 24 Recentl y in Sweden, the new leader of the Christian Democrats political part y stated that she would campaign for the introduction of a law guaranteeing a right to conscientious objection for health care workers.
25
The right to conscientious objection has also been asserted when onl y indirect participation in a contested service is required. For example, two midwives in the United Kingdom recentl y sued (unsuccessfull y) for a right to conscientiousl y object to the performance of services which were indirectl y involved in the 13 provision of abortions. The y were asked to 'answer telephone calls to book women in for care, and delegate to or supervise staff providing that care to women'. 26 Despite the indirectness of this involvement, the two midwives argued that they should have a right to conscientiousl y object to these duties. They did not object to answering phone calls or doing administrative paperwork as such, yet by their definition of complicit y they were as morall y involved in an action they believed was objectionable as if they were personally required to perform abortions.
27
In many instances, the right to conscientiousl y object to professional duties is argued to be c ontingent upon two main 14 costs on clients. 29 Where these conditions are met, it is argued that both objecting providers and their clients achieve their desired outcomes. Clients are able to access the contested services, while providers are able to avoid participating (at least as closel y) in actions which they believe to be i mmoral. Notabl y however, this solution is disputed, with some advocates for the rights of conscientious objectors claiming that such a dut y would still violate their right to freedom of conscience.
30
These examples all focus on the rights asserted by indivi dual persons to refuse to fulfil professional duties which they feel are prohibited by their religious beliefs. In the following section we examine a recent example which has significantl y extended the boundaries of the category of agents to who m rights to conscientious objection must be granted .
29 H. B r o d y & S. S. N i g h t. 'T he P har ma ci s t 's P e rso na l a nd P ro fe ss io na l
In te gr i t y' . Am J B io eth 2 0 0 7 ; 7 : 16-1 7 .
30 R . Ste i n. 2 0 0 5 . 'P har ma ci s ts ' Ri g h t s at Fro n t O f N e w D eb at e '. Th e Wa sh in g to n Po st 2 8 Ma rch ; R. Dr e ss er. 'P ro fe s sio n al s, Co n fo r mi t y, a n d
Co n sc ie nce ' . Ha s tin g s C en t R ep 2 0 0 5 ; 3 5 : 9 -1 0 : 9 .
Example Two: Corporate Conscientious Objection 31
Recentl y, the owners of three privately owned, for -profit ex e mp t fr o m t h e r eq uir e me nt to co n tri b ute to t he co s t o f ser v ice s wh i ch co n f li ct wi t h t heir val u es , P . W e st -Ora m. 'Fr e ed o m o f Co n sci e nce a n d
Hea lt h C ar e i n t h e U n it e d St ate s o f Ame ri ca: t he Co n flic t B e t we e n P ub l i c Hea lt h a nd Re li g io us Li b er t y i n t h e P a tie n t P ro t ect io n a nd Affo rd ab le C are Act ' . H ea l th Ca r e An a l 2 0 1 3 ; 2 1 : 2 3 7 -2 4 7 .
35 T he a s ser tio n t h at t he c o nt e sted ser v ice s ca u se ab o rtio n s i s d i sp ut ed b y med ic al e v id e nc e. Med ic al co n se n s u s o n t he fo ur co n te st ed s er vi ce s i s t ha t th e y ar e no n -ab o r t i ve, a nd p er fo r m t he ir co ntr ac ep ti v e fu nc tio n p ri mar il y b y p r e ve nt i n g o v ul at io n o r i n hib it i n g fer ti li za tio n , I . S i vi n. 'IU D s a re Co nt r acep ti v e s, No t Ab o r ti fa ci e nt s: A Co m me n t o n Re se arc h a nd B e li e f'.
S tu d Fa m Pla n n 1 9 8 9 ; 2 0 : 3 5 5 -3 5 9 ; 'Lo n g -Ac ti n g Re v er sib l e 
Co nt r acep tio n ( LAR C ) : I UD a nd I mp la n t '. T h e Am er ica n Co ll eg e o f Ob s te tr ic ia n s a n d Gyn eco lo g is t s
Against Unqualified Rights to Conscientious Objection
In the rest of this paper we argue that both in the individual and the corporate cases discussed, unqualified rights to conscientious objection of the kind described are incompatible 36 S up r e me Co ur t o f t h e U ni ted S tat e s, o p . ci t. no t e 3 2 , p .4 .
37 I b id : p p .9 -1 0 . T he Co u r t fo u nd t h at t h e go v er n me n t had a co mp e ll i n g in ter es t i n e ns ur i n g t ha t wo me n e nj o y ac ce ss to t he c o n te sted co n trac ep t i ve ser v ice s. Ho we v er , r at h e r t h a n r eq uir i n g co mp l ia nc e wi t h t he AC A, i t h el d th at a le s s r es tr ict i ve me a n s to e n s uri n g a cce s s wo uld b e to e xt e nd a n ex i st i n g co n ce ss io n, p r e vio u s l y gra n ted to rel i gi o u s no n -p ro fit e mp lo yer s, so t ha t i t al so ap p lied to clo sel y h eld , fo r -p ro fit co rp o r at io n s.
Fo r a d is c us s io n o f t he i s s ue s wi t h t h i s ap p ro ac h see W es t -Or a m, o p . ci t. no t e
34.
with the liberal, pluralist paradigm. 38 We also reject the claim that rights to conscientious objection prevent state intrusion into the private sphere of personal moral beliefs. Instead, we argue that in granting rights to be exempt from otherwise applicable duties, States allow ideological objectors to impose additional duties on other persons, and expand their own view of the good into the public arena, thereby restricting the freedoms of other persons to live according to their own view of the good. 42 O f co ur se, i n t he ca se o f p art icip at io n i n t he ac t ua l p e r fo r ma n ce o f ab o r tio n s, t he i n vo l ve m en t i s mu c h mo re d irec t , t ho u g h we ad d re s s t h i s b elo w.
J . C ur r ie & B . C. Mad r ia n. 'H eal t h, He al t h I n s ura n ce a nd t he Lab o r Mar ke t '. Ha n d b o o k o f L a b o r
Eco n o mi cs 1 9 9 9 ; 3 : 3 3 0 9 -3 4 1 6 : 3 3 6 8 -3 3 7 6 ; G. A. J e ns e n & M. A. Mo r r is e y. 'E mp lo yer -Sp o n so red He al t h I n s ura nc e a n d
Ma nd a ted B e n e fi t La ws ' . M ilb a n k Q 1 9 9 9 ; 7 7 : 4 2 5 -4 5 9 : 4 3 9 . 20 enable the latter to perform an action to which the former objects.
44
In the above examples , the link between o bjector and contested service is tenuous, and involves numerous causal steps. With regard to objecting individuals, it has been stated that if complicit y is taken to adhere so far down a causal chain, all persons would be entitled to exempt themselves from any duty which they felt required them to violate their conscience, without having to explain that belief, or offer any compensatory action in reciprocation for the exemption. . Eth i ca l P e rsp ect 2 0 1 3 ; 2 0 : 1 0 9 -1 1 7 : 1 1 4 . 47 Fo r e xa mp le , S a v ule s c u s u g ge st s t hat a p h ys ic ia n mi g h t re fu s e to trea t th e eld er l y o n t h e gr o u n d s t ha t t he y ha v e h ad a 'fa ir i n n i n gs ' J . Sa v ul e sc u.
'Co n sc ie nt io u s Ob j ect io n i n Med ici n e '. Br Med J 2 0 0 6 ; 3 3 2 : 2 9 4 -2 9 7 : 1 8 8 .
would either endanger patients on a regular basis, 48 or require major, costl y restructuring of medical provision.
49
Granting health care providers broad rights to conscientious objection would make healt h care services extremel y unreliable, and subject to the ideological commitments of provider s, rather than the medical needs of patients. Of course, certain kinds of discrimination of this kind would be prohibited by the UK Equality Act. 50 However, the existence of this legislation supports our claim in this paper, that the ideological commitments of health care providers should not be allowed to dictate what care is available to their patients. 49 Ca n to r , o p . ci t. no te 2 7 , p .1 4 8 4 .
50 T he Eq u a li ty A ct , 2 0 1 0 , c. 1 5 ( UK).
51 W e ar e gr a te f u l to o ne o f t he a no n y mo u s p e er r ev ie wer s fo r hi g h li g h ti n g th i s p o i n t to u s.
22
of affairs contrary to the convictions of that agent; it is not enough that the agent merel y enables or encourages that state of affairs'.
52
Endorsing Del Bò's standard for meaningful complicit y would therefore limit the number of cases in which a right to conscientious objection could be accepted. Doing so would allow states to consistentl y protect the right to freedom of conscience, while avoiding the 'anarchy problem' discussed above.
53
The anarchy scenario is even more problematic in corporate 53 E yal & Go ss er ie s, o p . cit. no te 4 6 , p .1 1 4 . T h i s d e fi ni tio n wo uld a l so ex te nd r i g h t s to co ns ci e nt io u sl y o b j ec t to h eal t h car e p ro fe ss io na ls wh o ma y b e r eq uir ed to p er fo r m ab o r tio n s. Ho we v er, as we d i sc u ss b elo w, o t h er rea so ns mo t i vat e r ej e ct in g t h e ri g h t to co n sc i en tio u s o b j ec tio n i n s u ch cas e s.
23
Voluntariness Second, it has been argued that rights to conscientiousl y object are already extended to wartime objectors, and that such cases are analogous to objections raised by non -military conscientious objectors because the objecting parties in both cases object to the killing of other persons (or those they define as persons in the case of health care providers). However, comparing the two cases is to assert a false equivalency between th em. Notably, participation in a profession which entails some objectionable duties is voluntary, while military conscription is not. 54 Nobody has to become a physician, nurse, midwife, or pharmacist, but having done so they have professional duties which th ey can reasonabl y be expected to fulfil, even if they assert a strong moral objection to those duties. no t e 1 6 , p .2 5 0 .
55 R. R ho d e s. 'T h e P r io r i t y o f P ro fe s sio na l E t hic s O ver P er so na l Mo ra li t y' . 
Private and public spheres
56 Co mp ila tio n o f P a ti e nt P r o tect io n a nd Affo rd a b le Care Ac t: I n cl ud i n g P atie n t P r o t ec tio n a nd A f fo r d ab le Care Act He al t h -Re la ted P o r tio n s o f t h e 
27
Objecting providers in these cases are therefore not obliged to recognise or respect the rights of their female clients to basic health care, reproductive autonom y and the freedom to live their lives as they choose. When individual providers object to a duty, it is in practice, usuall y (but not always) possible for clients to gain access to contested services elsewhere. However, corporate entities, having far greate r reach and power than individual health care professionals, are able to impose wider, structural costs on societ y as a whole when they assert rights to conscientious objection. They do so by firstl y exempting themselves from duties corresponding to many m ore rights to reproductive autonomy at once than individual objectors are able (all female employees at all times, rather than one female client at a specific time). In doing so, they impose far greater burdens on societ y as a whole than individual objecto rs. The costs imposed by the objections of individual providers are usually (but not always) isolated to client s, and to non-objecting providers who eventuall y provide service s. 63 In contrast, the costs imposed by objectors like Hobby Lobby demand State lev el restructuring of law, and health care infrastructure in order to ensure the continued accessibilit y of contested services.
63 W h il e t h er e ma y b e ma n y i n sta n ce s o f s u c h co s ts, t h e y ar e no t s ys te mi c , and ar e t yp i ca ll y r es tr i c ted to s mal l gro up s o f p erso n s .
28
Corporate conscience rights do not therefore guarantee the right to freedom of conscience , but rather entitle corporations to shape public policy according to their particular ideological preferences , and thus restrict the public sphere in which others live.
Competing freedoms, competing harms: the dangers for public policy
Our goal in this paper has been to argue that the concessions demanded by, and in many cases granted to, ideologically motivated providers of essential health care services are unreasonable and unjustifiable. This is because they could not be consistentl y granted to all persons, and because they deny the existence of important rights held by other people.
Consequentl y, we argued that these rights do not grant protections from excessive State interference, but instead allow objectors to dictate the terms of the social contract to their benefit. In doing so, we argued that the claims presented by societies. We must, therefore, engage with this debate, and defend important freedoms from gradual erosion by seemingl y reasonable concessions to unjustifiable demands.
